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In their philosophical work Ludwig Wittgenstein and Søren Kierkegaard both 
reflect on suicide as a response to existential despair. While Anti-Climacus, the 
pseudonymous author of The Sickness unto Death, rejects the contemplation of 
suicide as an outright barrier to an “awakening” of the self to its own sinful 
condition, Wittgenstein’s diary notes betray a different attitude towards such 
thinking; while he largely concurs with Kierkegaard’s characterization of despair, 
Wittgenstein strikes a less confident pose concerning the possibility of a leap into 
faith that would all at once overcome any thought of suicide. 
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A discernible trail of references to Kierkegaard runs through Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s writings, from early diary entries all the way to a letter to Norman 
Malcolm about three years before his death. As has long been recognized, the 
puzzlement expressed by his friend, colleague, and mentor Bertrand Russell 
upon discovering that Wittgenstein was reading Kierkegaard1 must be 
understood more than anything as a reflection of Russell’s own philosophical 
stance when in fact Wittgenstein’s engagement with Kierkegaard’s reflections on 
Christianity was sustained and substantial.  
 Among numerous remarks by Wittgenstein testifying to this close 
connection one will not find any direct comments on Kierkegaard’s critical stance 
towards suicide. Yet, even if he never mentions Kierkegaard’s name in this 
context—and even if The Sickness unto Death, the one work pseudonymously 
authored by Kierkegaard (under the moniker ‘Anti-Climacus’) that contains his 
most extensive consideration of the phenomenon of suicide, is not among the 
half-dozen of his works explicitly mentioned in Wittgenstein’s letters—
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Wittgenstein’s own reflections nevertheless seem to echo some of the central 
objections to suicide voiced in that book.2 Despite his own objections, 
Wittgenstein’s stance on suicide must not be mistaken for a univocal rejection or 
moralistic condemnation of it. In fact, his ultimately unresolved consideration of 
the question closely mirrors his ambiguous attitude towards Kierkegaard as a 
writer, shifting as it does between humbled admiration for the ‘depth’ of the 
Danish philosopher on the one hand, and critical assessment of the very idea of 
such ‘depth’ from the point of view of what we might call the legible surface of 
human behavior on the other. In what follows I will argue that it is Wittgenstein’s 
own conflictedness about the nature of philosophical writing that both attracts him 
to Kierkegaard, and likewise repels him to a degree, just as he is repelled by the 
possible legitimacy of suicide as a ‘solution’ to existential despair, yet unwilling, 
or unable, to conclusively reject this option out of hand. 
 Wittgenstein’s most well-known remark on suicide may be his early diary 
entry from October 1, 1917 in which he memorably identifies it as a crucible of 
ethics: 
Wenn der Selbstmord erlaubt ist, dann ist alles erlaubt. 
Wenn etwas nicht erlaubt ist, dann ist der Selbstmord nicht erlaubt. 
Dies wirft ein Licht auf das Wesen der Ethik. Denn der Selbstmord 
ist sozusagen die elementare Sünde. 
Und wenn man ihn untersucht, so ist es, wie wenn man den 
Quecksilberdampf untersucht, um das Wesen des Dampfes zu 
erfassen. 
Oder ist nicht auch der Selbstmord an sich weder gut noch böse!   
(Wittgenstein, Werkausgabe 1: 187) 
 
If suicide is permitted then anything is permitted. 
If there is anything that is not permitted, suicide is not permitted. 
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This illuminates the essence of ethics. Because suicide, so to 
speak, is the elementary sin. 
And when one examines it, it is as though one were to examine 
mercury vapor to capture the essence of vapor. 
Or is it that even suicide is neither good nor evil as such!3 
The central question contemplated in this passage is whether or not suicide 
should be considered an act with normative implications. The two alternatives 
offered here are stark in their opposition: either suicide constitutes the most 
fundamental ethical transgression of all, or else it—and, presumably, along with it 
all other human action—falls completely outside such normative classification “as 
such” (an sich). This striking disjunction becomes slightly easier to understand 
when we consider Wittgenstein’s theses offered around the same time in the 
Tractatus logico-philosophicus to the effect that both meaning (Sinn) and value 
(Wert) of the world must lie outside of that world (Tractatus logico-philosophicus 
6.41),4 and that death constitutes not a changing of the world but its end 
(Tractatus logico-philosophicus 6.431).5 Hence, an ethics pertaining to this world 
can only be maintained if some normative framework reaching beyond this 
perspectivally restricted world is in place. If the voluntary ‘ending’ of the world by 
one’s own hand were permitted, one would, in Wittgenstein’s first picture offered 
here, be destabilizing the world as such. Unless, that is, a world without any 
ethical framework whatsoever can indeed be imagined, which seems to be the 
speculative implication of the last sentence.  
 Most intriguingly, that sentence ends with an exclamation point! Why did 
Wittgenstein opt not to use a question mark? While the Tractatus denies the 
possibility of ethical propositions (Tractatus logico-philosophicus 6.42), it does 
not offer a conclusive rejection of ethics as such. Wittgenstein advances the idea 
of a unity of aesthetics and ethics (Tractatus logico-philosophicus 6.421), both of 
these equally divorced from the kind of sentences about the world as “that which 
is the case” (Tractatus logico-philosophicus 1) to which the Tractatus aims to 
confine intelligible language use. Wittgenstein thought the ethical significance of 
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the Tractatus to consist in exactly that about which it did not offer substantive 
theses but remained tellingly silent. Ethics for Wittgenstein ultimately is 
delineated by the shape we give to our lives by means of our actions. By 
extension, the proposed unity of ethics and aesthetics for Wittgenstein may be 
construed to mean that the identification and disinterested pursuit of the beautiful 
is a matter of doing something in a certain form, rather than of advancing 
particular claims. Philosophical writing as the putting of thought into linguistic 
form might well be considered one kind of such doing. If stating the unresolved 
ethical status of suicide hence does not amount to an (unintelligible) ethical 
proposition, it may rather be the exclamation point to a larger reflection on the 
relation of aesthetics and ethics. 
 The appraisal by Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous stand-ins of the aesthetic 
as a guiding principle to one’s life takes explicit issue with doing in singular 
pursuit of pleasure. The form of this pursuit creates, as the editor of The 
Seducer’s Diary would have it, the aesthetic as a second world beyond the actual 
world, “a world of gauze, lighter, more ethereal” that is itself perceived “[t]hrough 
a hanging of fine gauze” of poetic production (Kierkegaard, Either/Or 1: 306). 
This aesthetic world may serve as a refuge, or a realm of release, from the 
weight of actuality, and it is here that the aesthetic intersects with the 
consideration of suicide. The aesthete, who has dedicated his life to action in 
pursuit of pleasure, may eventually run up against the boundaries of the world he 
has constructed for himself, and his glimpsing of those limits may lead him to 
despair. As Julia Watkin notes, strategies to which the aesthete might resort in 
this situation, such as selectively reviving past pleasures in recollection, fighting 
off boredom by resorting to novelty, or, finally, celebrating death as the release 
from an overwhelming struggle ultimately do not alter the fundamental situation 
of the aesthete, “a state of suicidal depression punctuated by occasional bursts 
of pleasure” (Watkin 66).  
 All of this is taking place, as the post-Shakespearean metaphor offered in 
The Seducer’s Diary would have it, on a second stage behind the “stage proper” 
(Kierkegaard, Either/Or 1: 306) that is life in the actual world. The Sickness unto 
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Death provides a detailed argument as to why an aesthetic remove of this sort 
might be considered both a fitting context for contemplating suicide, and a 
problematic one at that. Similar to how Wittgenstein begins the passage quoted 
above, Kierkegaard’s text posits that suicide “for spirit is the most crucial sin,”6 
and goes on to compare pagan and Christian attitudes towards suicide. It is in 
specific reference to this phenomenon that a similarity between paganism and 
the aesthetic stage emerges (Ringleben 173). The aesthete is described as 
resembling the pagan in the sense that both consider suicide as a viable option 
in a naïve, insufficiently reflected way. The pagan does not realize that suicide is 
a “crime against God” (SuD 46) because he does not even conceive of the 
possibility of committing offense against God—a god, that is, which he does not 
recognize. This possibility can only be discovered individually (SuD 120), and 
since the pagan never enters the process of this discovery that is crucial to the 
Christian faith, by Kierkegaard’s logic the pagan does not so much as even have 
a self. Without a self he cannot possibly find himself in the situation Kierkegaard 
calls despair, namely the infinite coming-back-to-itself of the self (SuD 30). One 
way of describing that infinite process would be to say that the self, afflicted by 
the sickness unto death, is unable to die, and yet is without hope of life (SuD 18). 
The eternity of despair that results—or the despair of eternity, which amounts to 
the same thing—mirrors, as Hermann Burger remarked, the premise of Sartre’s 
play Huis clos, namely the inability to kill oneself because one is already dead 
(Burger 161 [§842]).  
 The aesthete as Kierkegaard describes him, though he may be suicidally 
depressed, never comes to experience this latter sort of dialectically heightened 
despair because the horizon of an alleged eternity eludes him. If the entire 
aesthetic world is indeed a stage behind a stage, it is by definition always an 
iteration of itself, always at a remove from the actual realm. As such it is able to 
conceive a multitude of ways of considering itself not addressed by the demand 
that, according to Kierkegaard, causes an existentially deep despair. In the 
Supplements to Either/Or, the successful avoidance of recognition in an aesthetic 
context is aptly described with a theatrical metaphor: 
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Reflection can wind itself around a person in the most curious way. 
I can imagine someone’s wanting to make a theatrical presentation 
of the fallaciousness of the age; but when he himself sits among 
the spectators he sees that no one, after all, takes it to heart except 
to detect the fallacy in his neighbor; he makes one more attempt 
and stage this very scene in the theater, and people laugh at it, 
saying isn’t it terrible how most people can see the faults of others 
and not their own, etc. etc. (Kierkegaard, Either/Or 2: 479-80)  
In other words, a spectator contemplating a stage—or a stage presenting yet 
another stage—may never be compelled by epistemological strictures or ethical 
obligations to apply the presentation of what is put before him with radical 
directness to himself. For him it is indeed true that l’enfer, c’est les autres, 
although he will not derive from this premise the Sartrean conclusion that 
consequently one needs to take responsibility for one’s own actions. 
 A gap presents itself here between aesthetic representation on the one 
side and being on the other. In The Sickness unto Death this gap is identified as 
the downfall of the poet, “the sin of poetizing instead of being, of relating to the 
good and the true through the imagination instead of being that—that is, 
existentially striving to be that” (SuD 77). The poetic representation of the 
“fallaciousness of the age,” which one might at first glance take to be 
epistemologically advisable and ethically commendable, would count as a 
diversion from “striving to be that” as much as any other. With his own poetic 
pseudonym Anti-Climacus inveighing in this manner against ‘poet-existence,’ 
Kierkegaard marks poetic form as a vehicle of imagination—or fantasy—that 
retains the detrimental capacity for human beings, as Russell Goodman writes, to 
“hide in rather than placing their own form on their words and thoughts” 
(Goodman 342). 
 Given the fondness of Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms for theatrical 
metaphors in disclosing the faculty of the imagination as fraught with problems, it 
is all the more noteworthy that Wittgenstein taps the same metaphorical field 
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when characterizing his own experience of reading Kierkegaard, and his struggle 
with the demands that this experience seems to place upon the individual:  
Erkenne Dich selbst und Du wirst sehen, daß Du in jeder Weise 
immer wieder ein armer Sünder bist. Aber ich will kein armer 
Sünder sein und suche auf alle Weise zu entschlüpfen (benütze 
alles als Tür um diesem Urteil zu entschlüpfen). . . .  
Was ich, quasi, auf dem Theater (Kierkegaard) in meiner Seele 
aufführe macht ihren Zustand nicht schöner sondern (eher) 
verabscheuenswürdiger. Und doch glaube ich immer wieder diesen 
Zustand durch eine schöne Szene auf dem Theater schöner zu 
machen. 
Denn ich sitze im Zuschauerraum derselben statt das Ganze von 
außen zu betrachten. Denn ich stehe nicht gern auf der 
nüchternen, alltäglichen, unfreundlichen Straße sondern sitze gern 
im warmen, angenehmen Zuschauerraum.7 
 
Recognize yourself for what you are and you will see that in every 
which way you are a poor sinner. But I don’t want to be a poor 
sinner, and try to escape in any manner possible (I use everything 
as a door to escape this judgment). . . . 
What I perform in the theater (Kierkegaard) of my soul, so to speak, 
does not make its condition any more beautiful but (rather) more 
detestable. And still I believe to be rendering its condition more 
beautiful by means of a pretty scene in the theater. 
For I am sitting in the audience rather than observing the whole 
thing from the outside. Because I don’t like to stand on the cold, 
quotidian, unfriendly street but enjoy sitting in the warm, 
comfortable auditorium. 
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Wittgenstein here describes the individual struggle with the existential self-
recognition called for by Kierkegaard as happening within a metaphorical ‘theater 
of the soul.’ Within the space of that theater it is not only possible but also very 
much his own manifest habit, writes Wittgenstein, to look for ways of avoiding the 
stark confrontation with himself that would reveal him to be guilty of sin. The 
staging of ‘pretty scenes’ successfully convinces the ‘viewer’—the aesthete 
engaging in a self-contemplation (one that by Kierkegaard’s logic functions as 
self-avoidance) wrapped in aesthetic gauze—to remain within the comforts of 
that aesthetic sphere, rather than to choose the barren reality of the street 
outside. 
 In this remark Wittgenstein very much seems to agree with Kierkegaard’s 
critical assessment of the aesthetic stage. However, he is likewise aware that the 
writer Kierkegaard manages to elicit the sort of response that is described by 
particular literary means. In a later notebook, Wittgenstein remarks the following 
about this narrative technique: 
Kierkegaards Schriften haben etwas Neckendes und das ist 
natürlich beabsichtigt, wenn ich auch nicht sicher weiß; ob genau 
diese Wirkung beabsichtigt ist, die sie auf mich haben. Es ist auch 
kein Zweifel daß der, der mich neckt mich zwingt, mich mit seiner 
Sache auseinanderzusetzen und ist diese Sache wichtig so ist das 
gut. – Und dennoch gibt es etwas was dieses Necken in mir 
verurteilt. Und ist dies nur mein Ressentiment? Ich weiß auch sehr 
wohl daß Kierkegaard das Ästhetische mit seiner Meisterschaft 
darin ad absurdum führt und daß er das natürlich auch will. Aber es 
ist als wäre in seinem Ästhetischen bereits der Tropfen Wermuts 
drin, so daß es eben an und für sich schon nicht so schmeckt wie 
das Werk eines Dichters. Er ahmt dem Dichter gleichsam mit 
unglaublicher Meisterschaft nach, ohne aber ein Dichter zu sein 
und daß er keiner ist merkt man doch in der Nachahmung. 
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Die Idee daß jemand einen Trick verwendet um mich zu etwas zu 
veranlassen ist unangenehm. Es ist sicher, daß dazu (diesen Trick 
zu gebrauchen) großer Mut gehört und daß ich diesen Mut nicht—
nicht im entferntesten—hätte; aber es frägt sich, ob, wenn ich ihn 
hätte, es recht wäre ihn zu gebrauchen. Ich glaube, dazu gehörte 
dann außer dem Mut auch ein Mangel an Liebe zum Nächsten. 
(No. 183 [“Tagebuch aus dem Koder Nachlass”], 122-3) 
 
Kierkegaard’s writings have something teasing about them, which 
is of course intentional, even though I am not sure whether it is the 
very effect that they have on me that is intended. There is also no 
doubt that the one teasing me is thereby forcing me to confront the 
matter he is concerned with, and if that matter is important that is a 
good thing. – And still something within me rejects this teasing. Is 
that only my own resentment? I know very well that Kierkegaard 
shows the aesthetic to be absurd with his very own aesthetic 
mastery, and that he means to do so. But it is as though in his 
aestheticism there is already a drop of bitterness, such that in and 
of itself it already lacks the character of the work of a poet. It is as 
though he were mimicking the poet with incredible mastery without, 
however, being a poet, and the fact that he isn’t one is evident from 
his mimicry. 
The notion that someone is employing a ruse to get me to do 
something is bothersome. There is no doubt that a great deal of 
courage (to employ such a ruse) is necessary, and that I would not 
have that courage, not in the slightest; but the question is whether, 
if I did have it, it would be right to make use of it. I believe that in 
order to do so one would need not just that courage but also a lack 
of compassion. 
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The irony of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms, if not exactly poetic, is, in Wittgenstein’s 
description, at least an incredibly masterful mimicry of the poetic, and as such 
something of a ruse. Kierkegaard’s aesthetic machinations approximate the 
poetic and—intentionally, it would seem—miss it by the narrowest of margins. 
 The question of how the literary and the theoretical are related in a piece 
of writing would be of immediate interest to Wittgenstein, who was adamant 
about the dual character of his Tractatus as both philosophical and literary,8 while 
at the same time being more than skeptical about whether his own writing 
reached the mark of poetry worthy of the name.9 One aspect for which both 
Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard seem to indict the poetic is the lack of clarity that 
results from its refusal to speak directly. Wittgenstein may admit that he is liable 
to avoid direct existential self-confrontation wherever possible, but he also notes 
that Kierkegaard’s indirect teasing by aesthetic means of his reader to do the 
(conceivably) right thing smacks of a lack of authenticity. If, according to 
Kierkegaard, direct communication about the most crucial things simply is not 
possible, then it certainly stands to reason that one should resort to indirect 
means. But Wittgenstein himself is direct enough in his notebook entry to remark 
that something about this strategy leaves him uncomfortable. It is not hard to 
appreciate that the ultimate appeal to existential directness, delivered in ironical 
indirectness, might elicit such a response. 
 In The Sickness unto Death, it is Anti-Climacus’ contention that “it is 
imperative to have clarity about oneself—that is, insofar as simultaneous clarity 
and despair are conceivable” (SuD 47). The self must clarify itself to itself in 
order to exit from the insufficiently self-reflective aesthetic state in which the 
hiding of oneself from oneself remains possible. This is the state in which 
Wittgenstein finds himself as a self-conscious comedy spectator: “Ich bleibe 
immer wieder in der Komödie sitzen, statt hinaus auf die Straße zu gehen” [Time 
and again I remain sitting watching the comedy rather than going out on the 
street] (No. 183, 202). 
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 But is a clean exit out onto the street, a full transitioning out of the 
aesthetic state actually possible? As Joachim Ringleben argues in his 
commentary on The Sickness unto Death, it must be considered an open 
question whether for Kierkegaard there really can be such a thing as full and 
utter clarity in the conscious relationship of the self to itself (175). It is 
conceivable that such clarity would have to be considered the end of despair as 
such, which certainly would not fit the dialectic of intensified despair through a 
clarification of consciousness that Kierkegaard is trying to work out in his book.  
 Wittgenstein’s concern with linguistic clarity, meanwhile, is palpable 
throughout his work. It also marks his recurrent skeptical self-evaluations of that 
work, and this self-directed critique, as I have argued elsewhere, has much to do 
with the written form of this work.10 As Wittgenstein moved from the hypothetical 
standpoint atop the Tractarian ladder from whence one might see “the world 
aright” to a radically modified methodological conception of what clarification in 
philosophy might mean—i.e. to patiently investigate linguistic practices and the 
surround in which these are embedded (‘language games’ and ‘forms of life’)—
he kept the ideal of clarity in view. Both the published remarks in the 
Philosophical Investigations and his unpublished writing, however, provide 
reason to doubt that Wittgenstein himself considered that ideal to have been met. 
Wittgenstein’s own writing seems to militate against the very idea of a radically 
clear sorting of the myriad confusions that are, as he so effectively demonstrates, 
at the base of many philosophical quandaries. 
 It is the qualified pursuit of the ideal of clarity on Wittgenstein’s part that 
may have kept him from distancing himself more unambiguously from the notion 
of suicide than he does, and—it may be argued—than Kierkegaard did. From his 
notebook remarks in the 1930s it is sufficiently evident that Wittgenstein 
considered suicide and was repeatedly given to despairing thoughts.11 While his 
descriptions of despair do echo those by Kierkegaard and sometimes even 
invoke his name directly, the connection drawn to suicide as a response is less 
clearly articulated than it is by Anti-Climacus. In one telling remark, Wittgenstein 
connects the two concepts as follows: “Die Verzweiflung hat kein Ende & der 
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Selbstmord endet sie nicht, es sei denn, daß man ihr ein Ende macht indem man 
sich aufrafft” [There is no end to despair & suicide does not end it unless one 
gathers up oneself] (No. 183, 119 [November 7, 1931]). Suicide is marked here 
as unable to end infinite despair. In terms of Anti-Climacus’ analysis, this is a 
pleonastic description of the ‘sickness unto death,’ since “every human existence 
that has become or simply wants to be infinite is despair” (SuD 30). That is to 
say, the very notion that despair is infinite itself sustains despair in a circular 
logic. This logic operates in the aesthetic realm, since “imagination is the medium 
for the process of infinitizing” (ibid.). Insofar as imagination, according to Anti-
Climacus, leads the self away from itself, self-inflicted death of the self—
suicide—has no purchase on this distancing which is at the heart of despair. 
What would make a difference would be to “gather up oneself” (sich aufraffen), 
or, in Anti-Climacus’ terms, to leap into faith, since “[t]he opposite to being in 
despair is to have faith” (SuD 49).  
 But how to do so? We may regard it as a function of the literary form in 
which Wittgenstein’s remarks appear, namely the diary that is not meant for 
publication and much of which is even written in code, but the self-directed 
reproach for not doing what would apparently be required to counteract despair is 
unmistakable in these remarks.12 Wittgenstein is not given to Kierkegaard’s ironic 
refractions, writing much rather with what often appears to be an attempt at 
utmost openness. Following the passage quoted above on his unease regarding 
Kierkegaard’s literary trickery Wittgenstein goes on to reflect on the suicide of his 
older brother during the closing days of Word War I on the Italian frontlines: “Ich 
verstehe den Geisteszustand meines Bruders Kurt vollkommen. Er war nur noch 
um einen Grad verschlafener als der meine” [I completely understand my brother 
Kurt’s state of mind. It was only just one degree more sleepy than my own] (No. 
183, 124). The ‘sleepiness’ of the suicide and of the one contemplating his state 
of mind must be understood as an extension of the inability ‘to gather up oneself.’ 
Wittgenstein’s professed understanding for this disposition in his brother 
indicates that any criticism of suicide is, in his case, also a self-criticism. It runs 
parallel to Wittgenstein’s repeated critical remarks about himself as trying to 
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make himself look better in his writing than he appears to himself. This includes 
confessional writing that acknowledges one’s own weaknesses, such as the 
following passage: 
Vielleicht habe ich nur insoweit ein Selbst als ich mich tatsächlich 
verworfen fühle. 
Und wenn ich sage daß ich mich verworfen fühle so ist das kein 
Ausdruck (oder nur: beinahe nie ein Ausdruck?) dieses Gefühls. 
Ich habe mir oft den Kopf darüber zerbrochen daß ich nicht besser 
bin als Kraus und verwandte Geister und es mir mit Schmerzen 
vorgehalten. Welche Unsumme von Eitelkeit liegt aber in diesem 
Gedanken. (No. 183, 104) 
 
Perhaps I have a self only insofar as I in fact feel depraved. 
And if I say that I feel depraved, that is not an expression (or only: 
almost never an expression?) of that feeling. 
I have often racked my brain over the fact that I am not better than 
Kraus and similar figures and have painfully reproached myself for 
it. But what an immeasurable amount of vanity is contained in that 
thought. 
The linguistic expression of a feeling is not equivalent, Wittgenstein claims here, 
to the feeling itself. Voicing the feeling of despair, or the feeling of inferiority as a 
writer—or at least the failure to lead a morally more defensible life compared—to 
satirist Karl Kraus and others is not the same as experiencing those feelings. The 
utterance of feelings of this sort is itself branded a form of vanity for which 
Wittgenstein reproaches himself. If any conclusion may be drawn from this 
circularity, it is that a pure ‘gathering up’ of oneself in the form of writing, a clear 
written acknowledgment of one’s own self as mired in sin (or Verworfenheit, 
which might be rendered literally as “thrown-aside-ness”) may not be possible.  
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 Simple silence, on the other hand, will not do either, neither for 
Wittgenstein nor for Kierkegaard. If Wittgenstein had believed that to “pass over 
in silence” anything not readily accessible to meaningful language were indeed 
the solution, he would have never had to write another word following his 
completion of the Tractatus. As the vast amount of unpublished writing following 
the (delayed) publication of that book and Wittgenstein’s return to philosophy in 
1929 demonstrates, he did nothing if not continue to struggle with, and against, 
the very notion that written language be completely transparent. Anti-Climacus, 
meanwhile, identifies silence as either an avoidance mechanism against despair 
that only furthers the loss of self (SuD 34-5), or, in a more acute case, marks the 
person of “inclosing reserve” who, in failing to confide in anyone, is putting 
himself at risk for suicide (SuD 66). If it were at all possible to wake from 
existential ‘sleepiness,’ as the subtitle of Kierkegaard’s book appears to indicate 
it is, then one would surely not be waking to silence.  
 It is perhaps not accidental that the question of the extent to which one is 
able to “gather up” oneself or bring oneself to take the leap finds itself directly 
adjacent to reflections about authorship. Kierkegaard offers a telling analogy of 
the weak, despairing person who adamantly rejects the consolation of eternity 
that faith would offer him:  
Figuratively speaking, it is as if an error had slipped into an author’s 
writing and the error became conscious of itself as an error—
perhaps it actually was not a mistake but in a much higher sense 
an integral part of the whole production—and now this error wants 
to mutiny against the author, out of hatred towards him, forbidding 
him to correct it and in maniacal defiance saying to him: No, I 
refuse to be erased; I will stand as a witness against you, a witness 
that you are a second-rate author. (SuD 74)  
Taking one’s own work as a witness against oneself to heart in the manner Anti-
Climacus suggests here, and subjecting oneself to the mutiny of one’s own 
written bounty, is not just a figure of Kierkegaardian speech. It in fact rather well 
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characterizes Wittgenstein’s reflections on the perceived shortcomings of his own 
work, that of a “second-rate poet.” The flaws inherent in that work are a constant 
subject of reflection in Wittgenstein’s notebooks where they are diagnosed with a 
double gesture that reveals itself to be aesthetic in character: “Kaum eine der 
mich tadelnden unter meinen Bemerkungen ist ganz ohne das Gefühl 
geschrieben, daß es doch immerhin schön ist daß ich meine Fehler sehe” [There 
is hardly a single one among my remarks in which I reproach myself that is 
written altogether without the feeling that it is, after all, beautiful that I see my 
own errors] (No. 183, 136). Pointing to one’s own errors itself constitutes an 
aesthetic value that may well be interpreted as a moral shortcoming (by 
Wittgenstein’s own lights it certainly would). An error is hence not just something 
to be corrected, but it may, in the event of a self-directed diagnosis of an error, 
become the occasion for a self-relation that finds, as Wittgenstein describes it, a 
kind of beauty in self-awareness. 
 Such beauty, or pleasure, stands in the way of the ideal that Wittgenstein 
so relentlessly invokes of clear-sightedness about one’s own limitations; the 
aesthetic gain, it seems, is itself the occasion for another self-deluding 
obstruction. However, this sort of pleasure, Wittgenstein writes, is part and parcel 
of what sustains a joy of life for him: 
Die Freude an meinen Gedanken (philosophischen Gedanken) ist 
die Freude an meinem eigenen seltsamen Leben. Ist das 
Lebensfreude?  
Es ist sehr schwer nichts von sich zu halten und jeden Beweis daß 
man doch ein Recht habe etwas von sich zu halten (Beweis nach 
Analogien) von vornherein, auch ehe man den Fehler durchschaut 
hat daß er irgendwo nicht stimmt (ja auch wenn man nie auf den 
Fehler kommen sollte) als Trug zu erklären. (No. 183, 108) 
 
The joy taken in my thoughts (philosophical thoughts) is the joy 
taken in my own strange life. Is that the joy of life? 
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It is very difficult to think nothing of oneself and to consider every 
proof that one is right to think something of oneself (proof by way of 
analogies) from the outset—even prior to finding out the error in the 
proof that makes it invalid (or even if one should never find the error 
at all—to be an illusion. 
A radical attempt to banish all error and illusion with respect to one’s own 
(presumably falsely inflated) self-esteem would certainly be difficult to see 
through to a conclusion. Even though Wittgenstein does not make this 
connection here, one such conclusion would be suicide. The pleasure taken in 
one’s own thoughts, in one’s own “strange life,” and in pointing out one’s own 
errors would hence constitute the counterweight to that most difficult step. If 
suicide is possibly “in itself neither good nor bad,” as Wittgenstein’s early dairy 
entry from 1917 had hypothesized, then it is perhaps fitting that its opposite, the 
“joy of life” (if there is such a thing), is situated between the moral taint of vanity 
and the a-moral tenacity of life in the face of the realization that it is riddled with 
weakness and error. For all the self-directed moral scruples Wittgenstein 
articulates in his notebooks, it is, in the end, a certain acceptance—despite 
everything—of the imperfection of life that banishes suicide as an option for him. 
Quite in line with Wittgenstein’s overall approach in his later writings, this is not 
so much an argument against suicide per se but, more modestly perhaps, a 
description of what stands against it in the particular life that is Wittgenstein’s 
own. Just like the linguistic practices that Wittgenstein dubbed ‘language games’ 
demand patient investigation and resist the philosophical impulse of broad 
generalization, there may indeed be no answer possible to the question of 
whether suicide “as such” is right or wrong. 
 Anti-Climacus likens the steadfast resistance to correction of the figurative 
error to the inertia of the self looking truthfully at itself. Held back in this way by 
“the whole production” of his life riddled by error, the un-faithful remains at risk for 
suicide. Wittgenstein’s unease at Kierkegaard’s aesthetic teasing and prodding 
his reader to doing the right thing under such circumstances, namely affirming 
faith in all its absurdity, is rooted not in the notion that faith would be undesirable. 
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Rather, Wittgenstein’s observation is that it is, in fact, the unfitness of his own 
self for the radically negative self-assessment that Anti-Climacus demands (his 
moniker carrying the very demand within itself) that may keep it from choosing 
suicide. The sum of Wittgenstein’s remarks on Kierkegaard suggests that he had 
the highest admiration of the form of life that the scene of Kierkegaard’s writing 
models for his reader. Despite the fact that his characterization of his own 
despair so closely mirrors Kierkegaard’s, Wittgenstein’s “own strange life” was 
not Kierkegaard’s. His attempts, “Klarheit und Wahrheit zu schaffen” [to bring 
forth clarity and truth] (No. 108, 46) by means of accounting for his own life in 
writing were not a path to an identical stance towards suicide to that voiced by 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, who would have the self attain utmost clarity about 
itself to the point where the admonishments of an uncorrected error will no longer 
be heard.13 
 
                                            
1  See Russell’s letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell from December 20, 1919 (cited in 
2  Genia Schönbaumsfeld notes the “striking” (16) parallels between 
Wittgenstein’s and Anti-Climacus’ stances on suicide. 
3  All translations into English of passages by Wittgenstein in this essay are my 
own. 
4  References to the Tractatus logico-philosophicus are given in the text by the 
decimal numbering of the propositions; the edition cited is found in 
Werkausgabe 1: 7-85. 
5  Michael Fox (154-5) points out that Wittgenstein here appears to draw on 
Schopenhauer, who likewise maintains that since conscious life is essentially 
a series of present moments, death cannot be experienced as one such 
moment. 
6  Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death [hereafter abbreviated in the text as 
SuD] 46. 
7 Wittgenstein, Wittgensteins Nachlass, No. 108 (“Band IV Philosophische 
Bemerkungen”), 102-3. All further citations from this electronic edition in the 
text with item no., item title (where given), and page number. 
8  See the undated letter by Wittgenstein to Ludwig von Ficker (G.H. v. Wright 
1969 32–3). 
9 The following passage expresses that skepticism without reserve: “Ich bin ein 
zweitrangiger Dichter. Wenn ich auch als Einäugiger König unter den Blinden 
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bin. Und ein zweitrangiger Dichter täte besser daran, das Dichten aufzugeben. 
Auch wenn er damit unter seinen Mitmenschen hervorragt” [I am a second-
rate poet. Even if I am a one-eyed king among the blind. And a second-rate 
poet would do better to give up poetry. Even if it is poetry by means of which 
he excels among his fellow human beings] (No. 117 [Band XIII 
"Philosophische Bemerkungen"], 193. 
10  See Klebes, Chap. 1. One memorable passage from the notebooks reads as 
follows: “Man glaubt oft — und ich selber verfalle oft in diesen Fehler — daß 
alles aufgeschrieben werden kann was man denkt. In Wirklichkeit kann man 
nur das aufschreiben — d.h. ohne etwas Blödes und Unpassendes zu tun — 
was in der Schreibform in uns entsteht. Alles andere wirkt komisch und 
gleichsam wie Dreck. D.h. etwas was weggewischt gehörte” [One often 
thinks—and I myself often make this mistake—that everything that one thinks 
can be written down. In reality one can only write down—i.e., without doing 
something that was stupid or uncalled for—what emerges in us in the form of 
writing. Everything else appears odd & practically like dirt. I.e. something that 
should be wiped away] (No. 183, 27). 
11  For one particularly stark example see No. 102 (“Notizbuch“), 65v (February 
26, 1915). 
12  The diagnosis given by Schönbaumsfeld points to the same conclusion: 
“Wittgenstein, given his ethical-religious conception, has contracted Climacus’ 
disease—the sickness unto death—but without, in the end, being able to 
reach for the ‘radical cure’ that Christianity would provide” (Schönbaumsfeld 
147). 
13  I would like to thank Dr. Josiah Simon for his assistance in compiling the 
bibliography. 
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